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COMMENTS
Minding the Public Interest: How the Not-So-
Effective Standard Has Led to the
Destruction of Wetlands in Louisiana
MEGAN BIERLEIN*
1. INTRODUCTION
Wetlands are one of the most important natural resources in
the United States. The Army Corps of Engineers defines wetlands
as "areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground-
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegeta-
tion typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."'
Wetlands commonly include swamps, marshes, and bogs.2
They are a habitat for thousands of species of plants and animals
such as water lilies, turtles, frogs, snakes, alligators, waterfowl,
fish, migratory birds, and mammals. 3 Many different species as
well as many endangered and threatened species are dependent
on wetlands as habitats. 4
Wetlands protect water quality by filtering out pollutants,
providing flood control by acting as a natural sponge and absorb-
ing excess water, and acting as a buffer to protect coastal areas
* Megan Bierlein is a third-year student at Pace University School of Law and a
2004 graduate of Denison University. The author would like to thank Professor Ann
Powers and the dedicated members of the Pace Environmental Law Review for their
assistance in preparing this article.
1. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2005); 40 C.F.R. § 230.41(a)(1) (2005).
2. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
3. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, EPA REP. No. 843-F-04-011A,
WETLANDS OVERVIEW 1 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/
overview.pdf [hereinafter WETLANDS OVERVIEW].
4. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF THE NATION'S WET-
LANDS 2 (2004), available at http://wetlands.fws.gov/bha/SandT/download/
SandTPaper.pdf [hereinafter STATUS AND TRENDS].
1
212 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
from erosion from waves, or storm surges. 5 Wetlands' capability
to control floods can lessen property damage, and can even save
lives.6 This is especially true in wetland-dense areas similar to
those found in Louisiana. Louisiana is home to one of the largest
regional wetlands in North America. 7
Until recent decades, wetlands were commonly filled in to
make room for development projects. In the last few years, the
country has made substantial progress in the protection of wet-
lands with a net gain of 72,000 acres of wetlands per year from
2001 to 2003.8 In 2003, 1,470,998 acres of wetlands nationally
were enrolled in a wetlands reserve program. 9 Defenders of the
environment must remain committed to the protection of wetlands
and see that these important resources are restored and protected.
The primary authority for the federal regulation of wetlands
dredging or filling is in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
or the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 10 The CWA is more than a pollu-
tion statute. It was enacted "to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 1
Wetlands are considered to be "waters of the United States."
12
Dredge or fill activities that discard pollutants into navigable wa-
ters of the United States are prohibited unless they are in compli-
ance with the CWA.13 Section 404 of the CWA grants authority to
5. Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.41(b).
6. WETLANDS OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 2.
7. WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G. GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 53 (2d ed. 1993).
8. Natural Resources Conservation Service, United States Department of Agri-
culture, 2003 National Resources Inventory Wetlands Tables, http://
www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/nri03/table4.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). The
National Resources Inventory is a statistical compilation of natural resource condi-
tions on privately owned lands, tribal and trust lands, and lands controlled by state
and local governments. Natural Resouces Conservation Service, United States De-
partment of Agriculture, 2003 Annual National Resources Inventory - Wetlands,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/nri03/nri03wetlands.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2006).
9. Natural Resources Conservation Service, United States Department of Agri-
culture, WRP Acres by State through FY 2003, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/
wrp/StateMapsStats/acres-sm.jpg (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2000).
11. Id. § 1251(a).
12. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2005); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding Army Corps of Engineers' decision to
require a permit for discharging fill material into wetlands); PAUL D. CYLINDER ET AL.,
WETLANDS REGULATION: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA PROGRAMS
35 (1995).
13. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) ("pollutant" in-
cludes "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/9
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the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to issue permits for any
activity involving the dredging or filling of wetlands. 14 Examples
of fill material are "rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction
debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation
activities, and materials used to create any structure or infra-
structure in the waters of the United States."15
Common activities that require CWA section 404 permits in-
clude real estate development; dam construction; levees, high-
ways, and airports; and the conversion of wetlands to uplands for
agricultural purposes. 16 Courts have held that land leveling, 17 re-
moval of vegetation,18 and the redeposit of spoil dredged by boat
propellers 19 are all activities that constitute a "discharge of pollu-
tants." The only exemptions to the permit requirement for dis-
charges into wetlands are listed in CWA section 404(f), and they
include normal farming, ranching, and harvesting activities, con-
structing irrigation ditches, and maintaining structures, that al-
ready exist.20 Other statutes also impose requirements on those
seeking a permit for dredging and filling activities, 2' but the CWA
contains the substantive aspects of obtaining a permit.
The Corps, acting through its Chief of Engineers, is the
agency responsible for issuing or denying CWA section 404 per-
mits for specific activities. 22 The Corps itself is not an environ-
mental agency but what it claims to be, an organization of
engineers. It is made up of over 35,000 civilian and military mem-
bers.23 Perhaps because the Corps is not an environmental
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and
agricultural waste discharged into water").
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); see generally Mark A. Chertok & Kate Sinding, The Fed-
eral Regulation of Wetlands, Part II: The Permitting Process, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCE-
MENT J., Mar. 2003, at 3. [hereinafter Federal Regulation of Wetlands, Part III.
15. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(2) (2005).
16. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA REP. No. 843-F-04-011,
WETLAND REGULATORY AUTHORITY 1 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/pdfireg-authority-pr.pdf.
17. E.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 929 (5th Cir.
1983).
18. E.g., United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1985).
19. E.g., United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir.
1985).
20. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2000); see also CYL-
INDER ET AL., supra note 12, at 35.
21. See, e.g., National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
(2000); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d).
23. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Who We Are, http://
www.usace.army.mil/who/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
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agency, the granting of a permit is subject to a veto by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 24 Additionally, a number
of other agencies, including the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS"), the United States Coast Guard, and regional
agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"), may
submit comments and recommendations to the Corps.25 The
Corps reviews each permit application on a case-specific basis us-
ing data regarding the proposed site of the project, input from a
public hearing, and information from a public interest review,
before making a final determination. 26
The Corps is required to follow guidelines in Titles 33 and 40
of the Code of Federal Regulations when ruling on permit applica-
tions and is expected to be neutral towards the proposed project.2 7
The Corps has only ninety days from the date of the permit appli-
cation to reach a decision. 28 The permitting process involves pub-
lic notice and, normally, a thirty-day comment period to allow
other interested agencies and organizations to provide input on
the validity of the application. 29 During the permit process, the
Corps may hold a public hearing regarding the proposed project.30
The Corps must also issue a statement of findings31 or, where an
environmental impact statement has been prepared, a record of
decision on all permit decisions.32 Although the Corps' procedure
is highly regulated by the Section 404 guidelines, the character of
the actual process can be subjective and vary greatly depending on
the particular district handling the permit application. 33
The Corps must consider the public interest in every permit
decision. The public interest review is quite broad, including con-
sideration of a number of environmental factors, such as:
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); United States Environmental Protection Agency, Wet-
lands, EPA's Clean Water Act Section 404(c): Veto Authority, http://www.epa.gov/
owow/wetlands/facts/factl4.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). This paper will use the
word "Corps" to refer to both the Army Corps of Engineers, in general, as well as the
particular District Engineer that may be responsible for the initial permit decision.
25. RONALD KEITH GADDIE & JAMES L. REGENS, REGULATING WETLANDS PROTEC-
TION: ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM AND THE STATES 36 (2000).
26. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 335 F.3d
607, 612 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4, 323 (2003)).
27. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(4), (d) (2005); 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(d) (2005).
28. GADDIE & REGENS, supra note 25, at 38.
29. Id.
30. 33 C.F.R. § 327.4.
31. Id. § 325.2(a)(6).
32. Id.; see generally Federal Regulation of Wetlands, Part II, supra note 14, at 3-4
(discussing the processing of applications for individual permits).
33. CYLINDER ET AL., supra note 12, at 49-50.
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conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental con-
cerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values,
flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore ero-
sion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation,
water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production,
mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in
general, the needs and welfare of the people. 34
Wetlands inherently perform important functions to the bene-
fit of the public interest; thus, any "unnecessary alteration or de-
struction" of them is considered contrary to the public interest.
35
The statutory guidelines generally do not allow the Corps to issue
a permit for an activity if a practicable alternative exists that has
a less detrimental impact on the environment. 36 In deciding
whether to issue or deny a permit, the Corps is required to evalu-
ate all of the above-mentioned factors and weigh them against the
benefits of the proposed activity, whether economic or social.
This article will examine how the Corps has used the factors
of the public interest standard to issue and deny permits and the
effect its decisions have had on wetlands. Specifically, this article
will attempt to show that the Corps' inconsistent application of
the public interest standard has led to the destruction of vital wet-
lands in Louisiana. This comment is restricted in its focus to the
Corps' review policies when addressing a permit to dredge or fill.
It will not analyze the guidelines for the EPA37 or the standard of
review in the courts. 38
Part II analyzes the public interest standard. It focuses on
the following factors contained in section 404 of the CWA: (1) the
practical alternatives analysis and (2) the cumulative impact and
secondary effects tests. 39 It then examines cases to demonstrate
how the Corps has applied such factors in its permit decisions, and
concludes by discussing the appropriate interpretation of the stan-
dard. Part III applies the same analysis of the inconsistent public
interest standard to Louisiana by examining specific contradictory
34. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1).
35. Id. § 320.4(b).
36. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2005).
37. Id. § 230.1(c); see also Mark A. Chertok & Kate Sinding, The Federal Regula-
tion of Wetlands, Part I, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Feb. 2003, at 3 (discussing
the role of the EPA in the permitting process and its intersection with the Corps).
38. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (an agency's
action will be set aside if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law").
39. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2000).
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cases and decisions of the Corps which demonstrate how the
Corps manipulates the standard to fit its present-time goals.
Part IV concludes by showing that the public interest stan-
dard has the potential to be the environment's biggest ally. How-
ever, the Corps is not fulfilling its duty to issue permits only when
it is beneficial to wetlands and the environment. Because of the
bias towards private developers and the Corps' lack of an essential
environmental purpose, its permitting decisions have led to the
destruction of wetlands in Louisiana and around the country.
The goals of this comment are to provide a critical analysis of
the Corps' process for evaluating a permit application for dredge
and fill activities and to draw attention to the Corps' manipulation
of the public interest standard. This article will argue the need
for objective guidance and proper interpretation of the words
"public interest." The public interest standard contains a plethora
of factors to consider, but not every factor is considered in every
case.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD
The Corps' public interest evaluation for permit applications
follows the policies set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 320.4.40 Each permit
application will introduce different relevant factors. The Corps
must balance those factors important to the public interest, the
foreseeable detriment of the project, and the benefits that are ex-
pected to materialize from the proposed activity in order to deter-
mine if a permit may be issued.41
Immediately before the CWA was enacted, Zabel v. Tabb ad-
dressed the need for a public interest review to evaluate the poten-
tial impact of proposed wetlands dredging and filling projects on
the surrounding environment. 42 In this case, landowners filed for
both a permit from local authority and a federal permit from the
Corps to perform dredging and filling in order to build a trailer
park in St. Petersburg, Florida. 43 When the Corps, with input
from the FWS, refused to issue a permit, these landowners filed a
40. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (2005).
41. Id. § 320.4(a)(1) ("All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be
considered including the[ir] cumulative effects . . ").
42. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'g 296 F.Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla.
1969).
43. Id. at 201-02. The authority for Corps to issue permits at this time was under
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-413. See id. at 203.
[Vol. 24216
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complaint in federal court.44 Throughout the litigation, there was
virtually unanimous opposition to the proposed construction from
the district engineer, the FWS, and other state agencies because
they believed that the project was contrary to the public inter-
est.45 The district judge, however, ultimately held that the chief of
engineers could not consider any public interest factors other than
interference with navigation and required the Corps to issue a
permit.46
Zabel v. Tabb marks the first time that the question of
whether the Corps has the authority to refuse a permit for dredge
and fill activities in privately owned navigable waters for purely
ecological reasons was presented to the court.47 On appeal, the
reviewing court praised the Corps for recognizing its responsibili-
ties to evaluate permits for dredge and fill activities with an eye
toward protecting environmental resources and reversed the
lower court.48 Although this case does not consider section 404 of
the CWA because it was not passed yet, it sets the groundwork for
the passage of the CWA and the guidelines put in place to protect
the public interest standard.
A. The Practicable Alternatives Test
One important factor in the Corps' public interest standard is
whether a "practicable alternative" exists that would have a less
adverse impact on the environment. 49 A practicable alternative
location does not have to be presently owned by the applicant, but
if it can be reasonably obtained, used, or expanded in order to
carry out the basic purpose of the proposed activity, it may be
deemed to be a practicable alternative.5 0 The applicant defines
the project's purposes, which are reviewed by the Corps, but the
test of "practicable alternative" is a decision the Corps itself
makes.5 1 The CWA section 404(b)(1) guidelines establish a pre-
sumption that all alternatives that are not "water dependent" or
do not involve a discharge into wetlands have a less adverse im-
44. Id. at 202-03.
45. Id. at 202.
46. Id. at 203.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 214-15.
49. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2005); see also id. § 230.5(c).
50. Id. § 230.10(a)(2).
51. Leonard Shabman & William Cox, Urban Water Supply and the Environment:
Extending the Reach of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 90
(2004).
20071 217
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pact on the environment. 52 The presumption will not be rebutted
unless the applicant presents clear contrary evidence. 53 Further,
a non-water dependent practicable alternative is only considered
available and capable of being utilized when taken "in light of
overall project purposes." 54
The alternatives analysis effectively creates incentives for de-
velopers to avoid choosing wetlands as potential building sites. 55
To evaluate whether the builder chose the best alternative, the
Corps must evaluate the alternatives that were available at the
time the builder chose the work site, not at the time the applicant
applied for a permit.56 Without enforcing the alternatives test at
the time of market entry, the developer has no incentive to look for
non-wetland sites. In Bersani v. Robichaud, for example, the EPA
vetoed a CWA section 404 permit granted by the Corps because
the EPA found that an alternative site was available to Bersani, a
developer, at the time he entered the market to search for a site to
build a mall.57 Although a different developer later purchased
the alternative site so that it was unavailable at the time Bersani
applied for a permit, in order to retain the functionality of the
practicable alternatives test and protect wetlands, the EPA exer-
cised its veto power and deemed this information irrelevant. 58
The EPA's interpretation of the regulations was upheld and Ber-
sani did not receive a permit.59
In City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, the Corps issued a CWA
section 404 permit to the Port of Houston Authority in Texas to
construct a marine terminal in phases over the course of twenty
years.60 The City of Shoreacres alleged, among other things, that
the Corps failed to consider a practicable and available alterna-
tive. 61 The City argued that the project was not the least environ-
mentally damaging practicable alternative under the CWA, and
52. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 230.10(a)(2); see also Alliance for Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534, 548 (M.D.N.C. 2004) ("Once the Corps determines the
water dependency of a project, it no longer considers the 'basic project purpose' but
analyzes practicable alternatives 'in light of overall project purposes.'" (quoting 40
C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2))).
55. Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 43-44.
57. Id. at 38.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 38, 43.
60. City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
61. Id. at 1000.
[Vol. 24218
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therefore the permit should not have been issued.62 The court
held, however, that the Corps' determination that two alternative
areas were not practicable alternatives was not arbitrary and ca-
pricious, even though building on the approved site involved de-
stroying many areas of unique wetlands. 63 One site was
determined to be unavailable because the Port Authority was una-
ble to condemn it; they would have been forced to purchase the
site, which was not an option. 64 The court stated that it is not
appropriate for the court or the Corps to get involved in how the
Port should allocate finances. 65 In reviewing the Corps' decision
to issue CWA section 404 permits, the court need not reevaluate
the alternatives available or reweigh the evidence; rather, the
court only has to determine whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors.66 The court had no choice
but to find that the Corps complied with the regulations in the
CWA because the Corps had asserted that the alternatives were
insufficient, and the EPA did not disagree.67
In Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Corps issued a permit to the Massachusetts Water Resources Au-
thority ("MWRA") to place fill materials in an artificial wetland to
create a landfill in Walpole, a town located near Norfolk, Massa-
chusetts. 68 The district court granted summary judgment for the
Corps and the First Circuit affirmed.69 The town challenged the
permit as contrary to the public interest because, along with other
complaints, the MWRA failed to demonstrate that no practicable
alternative with a lesser impact on the environment existed. 70
The court held the practicable alternatives test was satisfied, be-
cause the field of 299 alternative sites for the proposed landfill
was narrowed to ten sites, and then Walpole was chosen, even
though the court acknowledged the Corps did not "substantially"
evaluate the other proposed alternative sites. 71 The Corps is not
required to do independent feasibility evaluations; it is sufficient
62. Id. at 998.
63. Id. at 1021-23.
64. Id. at 1021.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1004-05; see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378
(1989); Delta Found., Inc. v. United States, 303 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2002).
67. City of Shoreacres, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
68. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1442 (1st Cir.
1992), affg 772 F. Supp. 680 (D. Mass. 1991).
69. Id.
70. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2005); Town of Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1443-44.
71. Town of Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1447-48.
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that the Corps found that no alternatives would have less adverse
effects. 72 According to the court, the Corps reasonably relied on
the applicant's (MWRA) evaluation as well as some input from the
EPA.73 The court essentially held that it is unable to overturn a
Corps decision if the Corps reasonably relied on the applicant's
determination about the project site. So, the court relied on the
Corps' decision and the Corps relied on the applicant's decision
and the result is a chain of conclusions affecting the environment
where no one is doing an independent analysis of the nature of the
project and the feasibility of alternative sites.
One way the Corps can rebut allegations of failure to consider
alternatives is to provide a complete administrative record ex-
plaining why alternatives were rejected as insufficient. That is
what the Corps did in Sierra Club v. Pena.74 The Sierra Club
brought suit to prevent construction of a roadway, alleging that
the parties responsible for the construction failed to show that no
practical alternatives existed.75 The court found that the Corps
had fulfilled its duty to consider alternatives. 76 The administra-
tive record detailed both the evaluation of proposed alternatives
and the rejection of such alternatives. 77 Although the plaintiffs
could disagree with the substantive decision that they were not
practicable alternatives, the Corps was able to show that they en-
gaged in the proper discourse and that was enough to satisfy the
court.
7 8
In 2004, the Corps granted a permit to expand airport facili-
ties in North Carolina. 79 A non-profit group filed suit to enjoin
construction and invalidate the permit.8 0 The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant airport.81 In this
case, the airport authority in charge of the construction sought the
involvement of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").82
The FAA prepared an Environmental Impact Statement, formu-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Sierra Club v. Pena, 915 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ohio 1996), aff'd, 120 F.3d 623
(6th Cir. 1997).
75. Id. at 1386, 1398.
76. Id. at 1398.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Alliance for Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534,
536 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 536-37.
82. Id. at 537.
220 [Vol. 24
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lated a purpose statement, analyzed alternatives to the project,
and considered the preliminary environmental impacts.8 3 When
making the permit decision, the Corps said it was not in the busi-
ness of designing airports and adopted the FAA's purpose state-
ment and alternatives analysis.8 4 The Corps did not re-evaluate
any alternatives rejected by the FAA or examine any additional
alternatives.8 5 The court said that it is appropriate for the Corps
to rely on input from many other agencies to assist the Corps in
the decision-making process.8 6 Here, the Corps acted properly in
relying on the FAA's expertise regarding airport operations, safety
concerns, as well as alternatives.8 7
Even more recently, a New Jersey district court approved the
Corps' decision to grant a permit where the alternatives consid-
ered were limited to the actual site of the proposed project.8, The
area in dispute is home to the Continental Airlines Arena, Giants
Stadium, the Meadowlands Racetrack, other buildings, and park-
ing facilities.8 9 The Corps determined there were no practicable
alternatives.90 The Corps framed the alternatives analysis to the
site the developers had already chosen because the project's pur-
pose was site-specific. 91 By framing the analysis in this way, the
Corps effectively sidestepped the presumption (that alternatives
to a non-water dependent project exist)92 by construing the pro-
ject's purpose in a specific way, which restricted the possible field
of alternative sites to the site already chosen by the applicant.93
The project's purpose was stated in such a narrow manner that it
restrained the Corps' alternatives analysis to the area already
proposed and restricted the court in its review. 94
There are at least five things to take away from these cases to
improve the standard regarding practicable alternatives and to
83. Id. at 537-38.
84. Id. at 540.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 551 (citing Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455,466-67 (N.D.N.Y.
1980)).
87. Id. at 552.
88. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 05-1724, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36385, at *1-3, 39-57 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2005).
89. Id. at *6.
90. Id. at *57.
91. Id. at *6-7, *29.
92. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (2005).
93. Sierra Club, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36385, at *6, *29-30 (explaining that the
overall purpose of the project was to redevelop the Continental Airlines Arena site).
94. Id. at *29-30, *35-36 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Whistler, 27 F.3d 1341,
1346 (8th Cir. 1994)).
20071
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make it more appropriate. First, the Corps' analysis in Town of
Norfolk95 is unacceptable. Although there was some evidence that
the EPA was involved, 96 the Corps relied too heavily on the find-
ings of the MWRA. The MWRA was the applicant and the Corps
should have conducted separate analyses of the practicable alter-
natives, destruction to overall wetland resources and groundwater
resources, and the adverse impact on habitats for wildlife. 97 Al-
though it may be true that the outcome of the permit application
would have been the same, the Corps should not have been ex-
cused from completing their duty to fully investigate the proposed
project.
Second, the Corps must not be constrained by technicalities
that hinder a complete and effective review of the public interest
practicable alternatives analysis. In Sierra Club v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers,98 the project's purpose was framed by the ap-
plicant in such a narrow manner that the Corps was restricted
from analyzing any practicable alternatives other than on the site
that was already chosen. The applicant, being the most knowl-
edgeable about the project, defines the project's purposes, but the
Corps should review such purposes for merit because ultimately,
the practicable alternatives decision is made by the Corps. 99 The
Corps should have the authority to decide when a project's pur-
poses are unworkable, and applicants should not be able to bypass
analysis of other possible sites by defining the project's purposes
in such a narrow fashion.
Third, the issue of when to consider the alternatives available
to the developer or builder was decided in Bersani'00 and should
continue to be followed. When the Corps evaluates practicable al-
ternatives, it examines those alternatives that were available to
the developer at the time it entered the market for a location. 10
Framed this way, the test prevents the Corps from ignoring or
side-stepping the practicable alternatives test. It also encourages
builders to find the best site in the beginning of their plans, or else
they may later be forced to relocate the project. The practicable
alternatives test is a key public interest factor, as demonstrated in
95. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438 (1st Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 1443 (EPA prepared an environmental impact statement and approved
the Walpole site).
97. Id. at 1443-44.
98. Sierra Club, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36385.
99. See Shabman & Cox, supra note 51, at 90.
100. Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 44.
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numerous cases, because it is the best option to protect wet-
lands.10 2 It is better than any mitigation efforts because it avoids
building on wetlands altogether.
The fourth lesson to take away from the cases discussed in
this article is for the Corps to constantly involve other agencies,
both local and federal. In Alliance for Legal Action, the Corps re-
lied on recommendations from the FAA because it had no indepen-
dent knowledge on the technicalities of expanding airports. 10 3
The FAA was able to prepare an analysis of what the project
would entail, how it would affect the environment, and what alter-
natives were available, if any. 10 4 The documents provided to the
Corps were more thorough than any it could have prepared itself.
Further, the Corps was proper in relying on these documents, as
the court held, because the FAA was a neutral entity providing
the Corps with the expertise necessary to make the permitting
decision.105
Lastly, it is important for the Corps to provide the court with
a detailed record, as it did in Sierra Club v. Pena.10 6 When the
court has the same information in front of it that the Corps had
when it made the permit decision, the court can then follow the
Corps' analysis of each of the proposed alternatives. The court
noted in its decision in Pena, that, with regards to the practical
alternatives, "the administrative record on this one issue is
lengthy, detailed, and exhibits a careful evaluation on the part of
the [Corps].'11°7 There can be no accusations pointed at the Corps
for failing to engage in the requisite considerations.
B. The Secondary Effects and Cumulative Impacts Test
Another important factor in the Corps' public interest stan-
dard is to evaluate a potential permit project for its "probable im-
pacts, including cumulative impacts ... on the public interest.' 0 8
When the Corps analyzes the cumulative impacts of a proposed
102. See, e.g. Sierra Club v. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Fla.
Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2005);
City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005).
103. Alliance for Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534
(M.D.N.C. 2004).
104. Id. at 537-38.
105. Id. at 540, 551-52.
106. Sierra Club v, Pena, 915 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ohio 1996), affd, 120 F.3d 623
(6th Cir. 1997).
107. Id. at 1398.
108. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2005).
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project, the Fifth Circuit has stated that it should consider: (1) the
area in which the effects will be felt; (2) the expected impacts; (3)
past projects, other proposed actions, and reasonably foreseeable
projects that had or could have impacts in the same area; (4) the
expected impacts from these other projects; and (5) the overall ef-
fect that will result if the individual impacts amass. 10 9
In City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, the City argued that, in
addition to the practicable alternatives analysis, the Corps must
consider whether the cumulative impacts of the proposed project
will cause significant degradation to the nation's waters in viola-
tion of the CWA.11o In this case, the Corps granted a permit with-
out analyzing whether the project would deepen the Houston Ship
Channel, and the City of Shoreacres alleged that consideration of
such an impact would have led to the denial of the permit."' Al-
though the plan to deepen the channel was not part of the articu-
lated project, the City argued that it would be absolutely
necessary in the near future and should have been included.1 2
The Corps concluded that the channel-deepening was too distant a
project to be considered a reasonably foreseeable cumulative im-
pact. 113 The court agreed." 4
In Town of Norfolk, another question before the court was
whether the Corps failed to consider secondary impacts on wet-
lands from the proposed discharge from the landfill. 1 5 In grant-
ing the permit to build a landfill in Walpole, the Corps analyzed
two secondary impacts on surrounding wetlands: (1) the possibil-
ity that a leak from the landfill could reach surface waters, and (2)
the possibility of losing surface or groundwater recharge." 6 The
Corps concluded as to both potential impacts that any effects were
not likely to have a major harmful impact; the Corps, however, did
not consider the cumulative effect of these potential impacts. 1 7
Although particular changes to wetlands may be minor, their cu-
109. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Conner, No. 98-3625, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10496, at *12-13 (E.D.L.A. 2000) (citing Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1236
(5th Cir. 1985)).
110. City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F. Supp. 2d 992, 999 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1006-08.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1008.
115. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1448 (1st Cir.
1992).
116. Id. at 1442, 1448.
117. Id. at 1448.
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mulative effect could cause major damage to wetland resources.' 18
In this case, the court stated that 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(3), author-
izing the Corps to consider the cumulative effect, did not apply
because the wetland was not part of a complete wetland sys-
tem. 119 Isolated wetlands have little impact on wetland systems
as a whole, and later decisions affirm that isolated wetlands are
indeed not considered to be "waters of the United States" under
the CWA section 404.120 Therefore, the Corps effectively ignored
any of the potentially damaging effects to the local wetland.
Not every potential impact qualifies as a secondary effect on
wetlands that the Corps is permitted to analyze. The Corps is not
permitted to "consider socio-economic harms that are not proxi-
mately related to changes in the physical environment."1 21 In
Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, a developer of a shopping mall was
denied a permit by the Corps under the CWA's public interest re-
view. 122 Guided by 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a), the permit was denied
because significant people in the community found the project to
be contrary to the socio-economic interests of New Haven, Con-
necticut, a town located ten miles from where the development
was to be built. 23 The reviewing court criticized the Corps for
basing its decision on impacts which "would not result from any
effect the mall would have on the physical environment generally
or wetlands particularly." 24 While the Corps may consider eco-
nomic factors that relate to the impact on the environment, the
Corps does not have the power to regulate economics between cit-
ies or to choose to protect one city's economic interests against
those of another. 125
In Mall Properties, the Corps denied the fill permit to protect
economic interests that were completely unrelated to the environ-
ment.' 26 The court's decision limited the broadness of the public
interest standard and reminded the Corps that their function is to
protect the public interest relating to the environment alone. The
118. Id. at 1449
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
165-67 (2001) (decided after Town of Norfolk and holding that isolated intrastate wa-
ters are not subject to the Corps' jurisdiction).
121. Mall Props., Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 563 (D. Mass. 1987).
122. Id. at 563-65.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 565.
125. Id. at 565-68.
126. Id. at 565.
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scope of the economic factors to be considered by the Corps "is lim-
ited to the effects of impacts on the physical environment, such as
commercial or recreational value of areas directly affected by a
change in the environment." 127 Mall Properties is an example of
how the Corps disregards its primary role in the permitting pro-
cess-to protect the environment and prevent the unnecessary de-
struction of wetlands.
The Corps can improve the appropriate standard for evaluat-
ing secondary and cumulative effects. The overall theme of the
cases seems to be reasonableness. It is reasonable to consider any
proximate effects if they can be verified. 128 Environmentalists,
scholars, and courts must urge the Corps to more often consider
possible derivative effects and the effects of projects that are likely
to happen in the future. The purpose of requiring permits before a
person can dredge or fill wetlands is to preventively protect the
environment. If the Corps is not permitted to take into account
foreseeable projects that would have an effect on the environment
and their decision, the function of the Corps as a body preventing
the destruction of wetlands is lost. 129
III. THE COSTS OF AN INCONSISTENT STANDARD
IN LOUISIANA
In addition to the federal government, many states have rec-
ognized policies of protection for important natural resources. In
Louisiana, numerous statutes have been enacted to protect and
restore the state's natural resources, including wetlands. 130 Wet-
lands are one of the most productive natural resources in that
state. 131 The local population has an interest in preserving bene-
fits of wetlands such as the protection from hurricane storm
surges outside of levee systems and the reduction of flooding in-
side the levees. 132 However wetlands protection has declined in
127. Id. at 567-68.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Tex.
2004).
130. Gregg L. Spyridon & Sam A. LeBlanc, III., The Overriding Public Interest in
Privately Owned Natural Resources: Fashioning a Cause of Action, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
287, 302-03 (1993).
131. Ryan M. Seidemann & Catherine D. Susman, Wetlands Conservation in Loui-
siana: Voluntary Incentives and Other Alternatives, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 441, 441
(2002).
132. Sheila Grissett, Wetlands Development Tackled in Parish Plan: 22,000 Acres
at Stake in Jeff, TIMEs-PIcAYuNE, May 22, 2003, at B1, B3.
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many areas because private landowners can profit from water-
front developments and the oil business. 133
The majority of wetlands in Louisiana are controlled by pri-
vate landowners who view federal protection of wetlands as a se-
vere intrusion on their property rights. 134 Because of the feelings
of local landowners, the Corps in Louisiana suffers from increased
pressure when issuing permits for dredge and fill activities. The
acting Corps in Louisiana, however, follows the same statutory
guidelines as the Corps does throughout the United States. The
factors considered in the permitting process are the same, includ-
ing the practicable alternatives test and the secondary effects or
cumulative impacts test.135 As applied in Louisiana, the result of
the Corps' public interest analysis has been much of the same.
Creppel v. Army Corps of Engineers was the first case to ad-
dress the CWA and the requisite public interest standard.136 In
this case, landowners challenged a Corps decision to remove a
pumping station from a proposed flood control project. 137 The pro-
ject was set out in phases, and between those phases, the CWA
was passed. 138 The Corps then required that all work cease until
a public hearing and public interest review could be conducted. 139
After such review was completed, the Corps intended to approve
the project as originally planned, with the pumping station, but
the EPA objected. 140 Eventually, the two agencies reached a com-
promise that provided for hurricane protection in exchange for al-
lowing the Corps to issue the permit.141 The landowners,
however, claimed that the proposed changes still abandoned the
purposes of the initial project.142 Here, the Corps concluded that
the project as modified would render flood control benefits and the
court would not act as an engineer to re-evaluate its conclusion. 143
Creppel, as the first Fifth Circuit case to apply the CWA sec-
tion 404 public interest standard, involved the court's refusal to
question a decision reached by the Corps. Other agencies were
133. Seidemann & Susman, supra note 131, at 442.
134. GADDIE & REGENS, supra note 25, at 37-38.
135. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2) (2005); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2005).
136. Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 670 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1982).
137. Id. at 566.
138. Id. at 567.
139. Id. at 567-68. The pumping station was still not built at the time of the court's
decision. Id. at 568-69.
140. Id. at 569.
141. Id. at 570.
142. Id. at 573.
143. Id.
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urging the Corps to make a decision that favored protection of
wetlands. 144 The Corps and the EPA construed the legislation to
allow changes in the project to better serve the public interest.
These types of changes in proposed activities allow the Corps to
issue the permit for the applicant while still ensuring that steps
are being taken to protect viable resources such as wetlands.
Such changes are a vital tool of compromise for the Corps to use in
its permitting process to meet both sides of the confrontation as
best as possible.
A. The Practicable Alternatives Test in Louisiana
A court reviewing a permit decision has only the administra-
tive record of the agency to base its decision on and does no inde-
pendent investigations itself. Thus, it is not surprising that one
federal court chastised the Corps for failing to prepare adminis-
trative records on proposed projects. 145 In Save Our Wetlands,
Inc. v. Witherspoon, the Corps simply stated that no reasonable
alternatives were available. 146 According to the record provided to
the court, the Corps relied only on a report which contained a
statement that, during a meeting, the applicant determined that
no alternatives to the projects were available. 147 No data was pro-
vided identifying the alternate sites that were considered or why
they were determined to be unavailable or impractical. 148 This
case is an example of the Corps shirking its responsibility to thor-
oughly evaluate the public interest. In addition, the court was left
with no record from which to evaluate the Corps' decision.
Save Our Wetlands v. Witherspoon is a case from Louisiana,
but it is similar to Town of Norfolk.1 49 In Town of Norfolk, the
court was satisfied at the Corps reliance on evaluations conducted
by others, namely the local water authority and the EPA.' 50 In
Witherspoon, however, the court was disappointed that the Corps
provided no documentation of the information considered at the
time the decision was made.' 51 In both cases, the Corps did very
little active investigation or analysis of the factors involved in is-
144. Id. at 569.
145. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 638 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. La.
1986).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1158; see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
150. Town of Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1448.
151. Witherspoon, 638 F. Supp. at 1165.
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suing the permit, the difference in Town of Norfolk was that a dif-
ferent agency provided data to the record, whereas in
Witherspoon, the record was bare. 152
The Corps is required to discuss alternatives to projects which
would reduce environmental harms while still achieving the goals
of the proposed project. 153 In South Louisiana Environmental
Council, Inc. v. Sand, appellant environmental groups sought in-
junctive relief against construction of a navigation project by the
Corps.15 4 The plaintiffs contended that the Corps gave a distorted
assessment of economic benefits and the costs of the project were
underestimated.' 55 The court held that the Corps made a good
faith effort to satisfy its obligations under section 404 of the CWA
and that to require reconsideration of the project on the basis of
marginal benefits from the project would be an impermissible sub-
stitution of its judgment for the expert judgment of the agency. 156
This case is an example of how the Corps' determination is most
often followed by the courts because they are unwilling to chal-
lenge the Corps'judgment. If the Corps is performing all the func-
tions that are prescribed to protect the public interest, the court
need not intervene. The problem arises, however, because the
Corps is not performing its duties, and courts are then unable to
make independent findings.
The real fear with regard to the Corps making decisions to
protect the environment is that, because it is not strictly an envi-
ronmental body, the Corps will make decisions favorable to the
applicants at the expense of the environment. In Louisiana Wild-
life Federation, Inc. v. York, the plaintiff asserted that very pre-
mise. 157 In this case, the Corps issued CWA section 404 permits to
landowners, allowing them to clear approximately 5200 acres of
wetlands for agricultural purposes. 5 8 The question before the
court was whether the Corps erred in considering only "profit-
maximizing alternatives" for the practicable alternatives test. 59
In this case, the court determined that the Corps no longer has to
consider an alternative site that may bring less revenue for the
152. Town of Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1448; Witherspoon, 638 F. Supp. at 1165.
153. S. La. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1980).
154. Id. at 1008-09.
155. Id. at 1010.
156. Id. at 1018.
157. La. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. Id. at 1046.
159. Id. at 1047.
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developer. 160 This case held that even if a developer would be able
to profit from the project if moved to the alternative site, if the
new location would render less revenue than the environmentally
damaging site applied for, it is no longer considered a "practicable
alternative." The Corps and the court are unwilling to make sacri-
fices for the environment at the expense of a landowner's profit-
making. The public interest test in this sense will only protect the
interests of some of the public-the private landowners profiting
from environmentally damaging activities.
The Corps in Louisiana, like the Corps elsewhere, needs to
consistently provide courts with an administrative record with de-
tails of the analysis it undertook when deciding the issue of practi-
cable alternatives. With a complete administrative record, the
courts are given a greater ability to play a role in the protection of
wetlands. They are also more effective in reviewing decisions
made by the Corps. When a court is not given the details neces-
sary to properly review a permit decision, they are bootstrapped
into simply approving the decision of the Corps. 161 Further, the
practicable alternatives test in Louisiana plays an important role
not only in protecting the environment, but protecting the lives of
citizens. If the Corps was better able to avoid building on wet-
lands in the first place, by finding an alternative site, there would
be more protection from hurricanes and flooding, and less destruc-
tion when natural disasters struck.
B. The Secondary and Cumulative Impacts Test in
Louisiana
Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon involved three differ-
ent permits for one project. 162 The cumulative impacts were con-
sidered significant only within the localized area around the
project site.' 63 The applicant acknowledged that at one of the pro-
posed sites, the project contributes to the cumulative loss of wet-
lands in the area and that at some point in time, it may become a
significant loss. 164 However, there was absolutely no documenta-
tion in the record to support these conclusions, and the Corps
160. Id.; see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that when deciding whether there is a practicable alternative, the Corps
must take into account the applicant's overall costs).
161. See Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 638 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D.
La. 1986).
162. Id. at 1159.
163. Id. at 1165.
164. Id.
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therefore decided that the project site would have no significant
impact on the environment. 165 The court was satisfied with the
Corps' decision based on only the testimony and evidence submit-
ted at trial. 166 The court wanted to remand the matter to the
Corps to better prepare a reviewable record, but held that it was
too costly.' 67
Witherspoon is a case that reiterates the need for the Corps to
do a more thorough analysis of the public interest and provide the
court with the data gathered. Although the court here was able to
gather the information at trial, it is imperative that the Corps pro-
vide courts with investigative work and specific findings. Cases
like this demonstrate that it is virtually impossible for a reviewing
court to evaluate whether the Corps' decision was proper when the
only information given to the court is a general finding that no
cumulative impacts existed or that it was not contrary to the pub-
lic interest. 168
Even in more recent cases, the courts have stressed that the
Corps needs to do more to address the specific facets of the issue of
cumulative impacts. 69 In Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Conner, a
Louisiana case from 2000, the court ultimately agreed with the
Corps that the project could be approved, but its decision regard-
ing the impact of cumulative effects was due almost entirely to
mitigation efforts. 170 Save Our Wetlands charged that the Corps
failed to engage in a vigorous assessment of the cumulative im-
pacts of the proposed projects. 171 The court basically agreed that
it was unknown whether the Corps had weighed the surrounding
development projects, but decided that by taking into account the
mitigation requirements and the isolated nature of the wetlands,
the Corps decision was not arbitrary and capricious. 72 The miti-
gation requirements satisfied the test for the court, but the court
itself acknowledged that the Corps had not even weighed the im-
pact from other development projects. As late as the year 2000,
the Corps continued to perform incomplete analyses of the public
interest test.
165. Id. at 1165-66.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1166.
168. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Conner, No. 98-3625, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10496, at *12-13 (E.D. La. July 20, 2000).
170. Id. at *13-18.
171. Id. at *16-17.
172. Id. at *17-18.
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The Corps is permitted to include benefits in its analysis,
however, an increase in the number of jobs, due to a construction
project, is not included in the economic benefits the Corps is per-
mitted to consider. In one case, Buttrey v. United States, a land
developer applied for a permit in the Mobile, Alabama district of-
fice of the Corps of Engineers to build a subdivision of residential
homes. 173 The Corps denied the permit. 174 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted sum-
mary judgment for the Corps.' 75 On appeal, the decision was af-
firmed.1 76 The court stressed that the unnecessary alteration of
wetlands is strongly discouraged and that the burden of overcom-
ing it was on the applicant. 77 Petitioner Buttrey argued that the
Corps should have considered in the public interest review the
number of jobs provided by his construction project.1 78 The court
stated that jobs are not the sort of economic benefit the public in-
terest review considers. 179
Buttrey is an early example of how the Corps needs precise
analysis of specific factors in the public interest review.' 80 The
Corps, in this case, fully addressed each of Buttrey's arguments
and justified its decision using proper analysis.' 8 ' The Corps then
came to the conclusion that jobs from construction are not the type
of economic factor to be taken into account by 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(a).' 82 The environmental assessment made by the Corps
noted numerous public interest factors weighing against Buttrey:
destruction of tupelo gum swamp, change in the land use, poten-
tial air pollution problems, increased noise levels, and increased
traffic.' 83 The public interest was properly considered and the
Corps determined that it is best served by a denial of the permit
request.' 84 The Corps' decision was backed by what all their deci-
sions should be backed by-reason and analysis.
173. Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1172 (5th Cir. 1982).
174. Id. at 1173; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
175. Buttrey, 690 F.2d at 1174.
176. Id. at 1172.
177. Id. at 1180.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg.
37,122, 125-26 (1977)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1183.
182. Id. at 1180.
183. Id. at 1184-85.
184. Id. at 1185.
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A positive example from Louisiana is Save Our Wetlands v.
Julich.18 5 In this case, the Corps did address the cumulative ef-
fect of a project to construct a development project.'8 6 The Corps
listed six different negative impacts that would result from the
project and other reasonably foreseeable projects, but analyzed
each one and concluded that these changes would be minor.18 7
The Corps also took into account positive secondary effects such as
enhanced economics of the town and newly available municipal
funds to improve drainage and alleviate flooding.' 88 According to
the court, the Corps' conclusion that there was no significant neg-
ative impact was correct.' 8 9 In this case, the court was satisfied
that the Corps took into account both the direct and indirect ef-
fects of the proposed project and weighed their disadvantages and
benefits sufficiently. 90
Julich is a working example of how the Corps can function
properly and make positive decisions for the environment when it
cooperates with other agencies. 19 During the permit process, the
Corps got feedback from the Louisiana Department of Environ-
mental Quality, the EPA, the U.S. Department of Commerce and
National Marine Fisheries Services, the Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries, the FWS, the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, and other concerned citizens. 192 This input not only helps
the Corps in its initial permit determination, but also provides the
court with a comprehensive record from which to review the
Corps' decision. In this case, the Corps considered the cumulative
effects of the proposed project as well as potential future projects
and all of the agencies involved were satisfied.' 93
185. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Julich, No. 01-3472, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1294
(E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2002).
186. Id. at *1, *6-7.
187. Id. at *6-7.
188. Id. at *7.
189. Id. at *11-13.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *4-5; see also B & B P'ship v. United States, No. 96-2025, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 36086, at *4-5, *14 (4th Cir. July 15, 1997) (Corps relied on input from FWS
and the National Marine Fishery Service to deny a permit for a project whose adverse
impacts outweighed the project's benefits).
192. Julich, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1294, at *4-5. The EPA listed requirements
that had to be met before the Corps could issue a permit. Id. at *4.
193. Id. at *6-7, *12.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has suggested that the destruction of wetlands in
Louisiana, in particular, and across the United States, in general,
is due in large part to the inconsistent use of the public interest
standard. The standard of review for the court is that it must up-
hold a decision of the Corps unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, [or] not in accordance with law .. ,,194 This
results in the courts having a narrow scope of review in order to
find grounds for reversal of the agency's decision. Courts have de-
termined that they cannot substitute their judgment for the
Corps'. A court can only evaluate whether the Corps' decision was
based on the consideration of relevant factors, which has led
courts to allow many of the Corps' permit granting decisions, in-
cluding its public interest determinations, to stand.195 Even if a
court would have reached a different conclusion than the Corps,
"Congress has imparted this decision to the Corps of Engineers"
and the court will not upset its decision. 196 Courts acquiesce that
this deference to the Corps may be necessary when dealing with
complex environmental regulations such as the CWA. 197 How-
ever, because the courts have such a narrow standard of review, it
is imperative that the Corps performs a thorough investigation
into the impacts on the surrounding environment and the public
interest.
Property owners complain that government regulation of wet-
lands restricts their ability to develop their land, while environ-
mentalists argue that the destruction of wetlands creates serious
ecological damage. It is the Corps' duty to issue permits to de-
velop land only when doing so would not be detrimental to wet-
lands and the environment. The public interest standard has the
potential to be the environment's biggest ally. However, if the
considerations contained in 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) are not meaning-
fully and consistently applied by the Corps, wetlands everywhere
194. City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(quoting Welch v. U.S. Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (N.D. Tex. 2003)).
195. Id. at 1003 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971); City of Alexandria v. Fed. Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir.
1985)); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1445-46 (1st Cir.
1992).
196. Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs, 670 F.2d 564, 572 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
C.A. White Trucking Co. v. United States, 555 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1977)).
197. See, e.g., Envtl. Coal. of Broward County, Inc. v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 986
(l1th Cir. 1987).
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will be no more protected than if the public interest standard did
not exist at all.
The surrounding environment is affected in some way every
time the earth is dug into, moved, changed, and built upon. The
terms in 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 were created to effectuate the best pos-
sible protection of the environment when changes are proposed.
The Corps itself must actually develop techniques to deal with
each of the factors in the public interest review. The Corps cannot
simply declare that it "determined the proposed project has no sig-
nificant impact on the environment" as a convenient way of satis-
fying the court and simultaneously deflecting attacks by
environmentalists on its granting of permits. In Louisiana, envi-
ronmentalists are not shy about accusing the Corps of taking the
side of developers and encouraging the destruction of wetlands. 198
It is a daunting task to try to persuade the Corps to adopt a
more uniform approach to the public interest standard when re-
viewing permit applications. This is a task not only for environ-
mental groups across the country, but for every city and every
developer and builder as well. One of the main problems associ-
ated with this task is that the Corps, being the body charged with
protection of the environment, sees the section 404 guidelines as
mere factors, which it then weighs against other factors in the
public interest review, rather than seeing the guidelines as
threshold standards to which they must adhere. 199
As this article pointed out, the Army Corps of Engineers is not
an environmental agency. The Corps is part of the national army.
It is comprised of engineers, scientists, and real estate specialists
who work mostly with national security and emergency mat-
ters. 200 In fact, the Corps' regulations until 1968 focused only on
the protection of navigation. 20' The Corp did not have any gov-
erning environmental principles until 2002.202 They are certainly
not in the best position to advocate for and protect the environ-
198. Vicki Ferstel, Environmentalists Protest Wetlands Permit Changes: Industry
and Landowners Giving Cautious Approval, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 1, 1997, at 3B.
199. See id. (discussion of how the EPA and the FWS view section 404 as a thresh-
old rather than a factor of economic analysis or part of a balancing process as the
Corps views section 404 due to a "fundamental conflict" in the missions of each
agency).
200. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Who We Are, http:l!
www.usace.army.mil/who/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
201. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(1) (2005).
202. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Operating Principles,
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ment. This paper challenges all individuals and organizations to
work to influence the legislature and the Corps to develop envi-
ronmentally friendly and consistent definitions for the factors
comprising the public interest review. A case-by-case analysis
does not have to be illogical or unjust. All citizens of the environ-
ment should be able to expect the Army Corps of Engineers to is-
sue fill permits in a manner that is consistent with the goals of the
CWA.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/9
